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covenant to repair, the landlord's duty to the public to maintain the
structure in safe condition, and his retention of power to perform the
duty combine to make him liable."
In the principal case it would seem that the Court of Appeals was
misled by the decision in Berkowitz v. Winston."8 That case dealt with
an employee of a lessee, but the syllabus read: "Liability in tort is an
incident to occupation and control; occupation and control are not
reserved by an agreement to make repairs." And while the Court of
Appeals recognized that this statement was limited by the facts in the
case, it felt that the same rule was applicable in the case of a pedestrian.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court viewed the matter in a different light,
although no mention was made of the Berkowitz case in the opinion.
It is submitted that the result reached in the principal case was entirely
just and in harmony with the prevailing law in the country. It is, how-
ever, to be regretted that the court considered it unnecessary to review
the status of the law on the problem. Instead, the court virtually disposes
of the case with the laconic statement: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas." W. L. A.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTION STATUTE
PER SE NEGLIGENCE - PROXIMATE CAUSE
Plaintiff sustained injuries when an automobile in which he was
riding as a passenger struck the defendant's freight car at a common
grade crossing. Both driver and plaintiff were familiar with highway
and crossing. The accident occurred at night; some witnesses said there
was fog. No special precautions had been taken by the defendant to
warn approaching motorists of the obstruction. Conflicting testimony
indicated that the defendant's employees, engaged in a switching opera-
tion, had allowed the freight car to remain in a position blocking the
highway for a period longer than the statutory five minutes. This being
a violation of G.C. sec. 7472, plaintiff contended that defendant
was negligent as a matter of law, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of his injuries.' The trial court's judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed in the appellate court of the Sixth District, and
final judgment entered for the defendant. Because of a conflicting deci-
8 528 Ohio St. 6nz, 193 N.E. 34.3 (1934).
' Ohio G.C. 7472: "A person or corporation . . . who obstructs, unnecessarily, a pub-
lic road or highway authorized by any law of this state, by permitting a railroad car or
locomotive to remain upon or across it for longer than five minutes . . . shall forfeit
and pay for each offense, not less than two dollars, nor more than twenty dollars." See
also General Code Section 7473 regarding liability of the railroad for damages resulting
from violation of the preceding section.
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sion in the Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District,2 the cause
was heard by the Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court
(three judges dissenting) held that there was no duty on the part of the
defendant to provide further warning than the presence of the car on
the crossing, that G.C. sec. 7472 was not a safety statute but a measure
designed to facilitate the movement of traffic on the highways, and that
the occupancy of the freight car beyond the prescribed limit was a con-
dition and not a proximate cause of the collision.'
The majority holding is based upon principles generally well estab-
lished in Ohio and other jurisdictions respecting a railroad's liability in
collisions of this character. Conflicting views, comparatively few in
number, may be reconciled largely on the basis of special circumstances.4
But the cases, especially in those jurisdictions having highway obstruction
statutes specifically applicable to railroad cars,' give evidence of notable
disagreement regarding application of such statutes to collisions.
In the absence of a specific statute, it seems clear that there is no duty
on a railroad company to provide special warnings or to take extraordi-
nary measures to advise motorists of the obstruction of a crossing. The
presence of the train is deemed sufficient notice to the driver.6 Circum-
stances might be imagined, however, where the standard of due care
would impose a greater obligation upon the railroad (i.e., a breakdown
5 Short v. Penna Rd. Co., 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N.E. 737, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 584
(1933).
' Capdlle v. B. &" 0. Rd. Co., 136 Ohio St. 203 (x939).
'In Reines, Admrlx v. Chicago, Al., St. P. & P. Rd. Co., 19S Wash. 146, So P.
(2d) 4o6 (1938), the court, in view of the fact that it had been recently presented with an
unusual number of cases involving grade-crossing mishaps, made an analysis of 75 cases
similar in character to Capclc v. B. & 0., supra, n. 3- In only 17 of these was the case
sent to the jury. "In all others it was held that a person so unfortunate as to drive or be
driven into the side of a train standing or moving over a grade-crossing, could not as a
matter of law, recover from the railroad company." Of the 17 cases sent to the jury, five
were violations of positive law (among which was Short v. Penna Rd. Co. supra n. z),
one involved a crossing watchman not on duty, two were trap cases (i.e., lighted passenger
cars hauling flat, unlighted freight cars), and the remaining nine were from five jurisdic-
tions. In all, courts in 27 jurisdictions denied recovery.
The frequency with which collisions such as the one which gave rise to the principal
case occur, is reflected in a recent survey of crossing mishaps. Statistics show that 56% of
the railroad crossing accidents which happen during the night result from cars running
into trains which have stopped upon or are moving across the highway. Accident Facts,
1939 Edition, National Safety Council, Inc.
' Comparable statutes: Ill., Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (933), ch. 114, s. 70, 71i Ind.,
Burns' Stat. (1933), s. 10-3904; Ky., Carroll's Stat. (1936), s. 4350i Mass., Gen. Laws
(1932), ch. 16o, s. xs; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), S. 11121; N.Y., Cahill's Consol.
Laws, ch. 41, s. 19855 Penna., Purdon's Stat. (1936), title 67, s. 452 et seq.
'Reed 4dm. v. Erie Rd. Co., 134 Ohio St. 31, x N.E. (2d) 637 (1938)i C. F.
Boecrs v. Great N. Ry. Co. (N.D.) 259 N.W. 99, 99 A.L.R. 144-3 (1935); Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Switzer, 275 Ky. 834, Izz S.W. (zd) 967 (1938); Bledsoe v. Mis-
souri, 149 Kan. 741, 90 P. (2d) 9 (1939)i Dolan v. Bremmer Rec'r., Z20 Iowa 1143,
263 N.W. 798 (935); lVcbb v. Oregon-Wash. Rd. & Nay. Co., 195 Wash. iSS, So P.
(2d) 409 (1938).
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on a hazardous crossing, during a dense fog.) The holding in the instant
case is flexible enough to permit such exception: "It is conceivable that
a public crossing might possess such features of inherent danger or be
so dangerous at a particular time as to require a railroad company, in
the exercise of due care, to take appropriate measures to protect highway
travelers from colliding with a train standing on the crossing . . ." In
the view of the court, no such exceptional circumstances existed in this
instance.
A more tenable basis for the plaintiff's contention in the principal
case lies in the allegation that the defendant's violation of G.C. sec. 7472
is negligence per se. It should be noted, here, that no violation of this
statute is proved without a showing that the obstruction beyond the
statutory period was unnecessary.' It is generally recognized that viola-
tion of a statute enacted for the benefit of the plaintiff is negligence
per se.' Many statutes are passed with no intention to benefit individuals
(i.e., revenue statutes) and a violation of such an enactment would
clearly have no effect upon the question of negligence. The court, in
the principal case, says that the statute invoked by the plaintiff was en-
acted to facilitate the movement of traffic on the highways, and not to
prevent automobiles from being driven against freight cars obstructing
them. It was, therefore, not a measure intended to benefit persons in
the position of the plaintiff, and its violation is not an act of negligence
upon which this plaintiff can predicate a recovery.' Where litigants
have relied upon violations of similar statutes to recover damages result-
ing proximately from delay, the courts have allowed recovery.'" Cases
in this category are distinguished from the principal case on the ground
that delay was the particular hazard which the legislature intended to
remove, and that the enacting body contemplated a benefit to persons
suffering damage therefrom." The holdings in other jurisdictions are
not in complete accord respecting the construction of like statutes. Many
have viewed such obstruction statutes as measures to promote safety on
'W. & L. E. Rd. Co. v. Mackey, 53 Ohio St. 370, 4 N.E. 980, 29 L.R.A. S75, 53
Am. St. Rep. 641 (i895); Trustees of Burton Twp. v. Tuttle, 30 Ohio St. 6z (1876).
8 Schell v. Du Bois Adm'r., 94- Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, L.R.A. 1917A, 710
(1916).
'Culbertson v. Warden, 32 Ohio L. Rep. 6 (930)" "In a common law action for
negligence it is prejudicial error for the court to charge the jury on negligence per se
under General Code s. 7472 et seq."
Simpson v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 276 Mich. 653, 268 N.W. 769 (1936).
10 Cleveland, C., C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Toner, 176 Ind. 6zx, 96 N.E. 758, 39 L.R.A.
(N.S.) zo (19xi); Patterson v. Detroit L. & N. Rd. Co., 56 Mich. 172, 2z NAV. z6o
(i885); Terry v. New Orleans, G. N. Rd. Co., 103 Miss. 679, 6o SO. 729z, 44 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1069 (1912).
U1 Supra, note 3.
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the highway, and have held violations thereof to be negligence per se."
But it should be noted that where per se negligence has been conceded,
other grounds for denying recovery have generally been found." The
court seems justified in its ruling that the violation of statute was not
negligence per se with respect to this plaintiff.
It seems clear that by the construction which the court has given
to G.C. sec. 7472, plaintiffs who suffer injury under similar circum-
stances will be unable to recover. But granting, for the moment, a
negligent violation on the part of the railroad, a problem of causation
(which the court deemed worthy of comment) is presented. It is ele-
mental in the law of negligence that the plaintiff must show more
than the violation of a statute enacted for his benefit. He must show
that the negligent violation was the proximate cause of his injuries-or,
at least, that it was a concurring proximate cause.' 4 The court, citing
Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Staley," submits that the presence of
the train on the crossing was a condition, not a cause of the accident.
Other courts have approached the causation problem from the same
angle, reasoning that the collision could have occurred as readily within
the statutory period as beyond it."t But, if the continuing obstruction
of the highway be conceded to constitute negligence (which the court
does for the sake of analysis), it is difficult to agree with the court's con-
clusion that the driver's negligence is, as a matter of law, the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and that the railroad's negligent act was
merely a condition. The distinction between cause and condition does
not resolve the problem of causation; it merely presents a more elusive
question as to whether the defendant's negligence should be termed
"icause" or "condition."'" When two negligent acts-an unlawful ob-
struction of the highway and a driver's negligence-combine to produce
a collision, labeling one a condition and the other a cause is of little
help. Where both acts are operative at the time of impact, it seems more
reasonable to conclude that both are proximate causes. The majority
holding rests more securely upon other grounds. R. M. A.
'Galvcston, H. & S. Ry. Co. v. Marti, (Tex. Civ. App.) 18 3 S.W. 84 6 (1916);
Pen,&,. R. Co. v. Huss, 96 Ind. App. 71, i8o N.E. gig (1932); Hofstedt v. Southern
Pac. Co., (Cal.) i P. (2d) 470 (193) i Dickey v. Atl. C. L. R. Co., 196 N.C. 726, 147S.E. 15 (2929).
"Elliot v. Missouri R. R. Co., 227 Mo. App. 225, 52 S.W. (2d) 448 (I932)i
Henlley v. Chicago & N. TV. R. Co., x9 S Wis. 569, z2z N.W. zoq (1929).
" Martin v. Herzog, zzS N.Y. 164, iz6 N.E. S14 (1920) ; Cincinnati St. R. Co. v.
Murray, _q3 Ohio St. 570, 42 N.E. 596, 30 L.R.A. 5oS (1895).
Pitfssurg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Staley, 41 Ohio St. 118, 52 Am. St. Rep. 74
(x884).
"' Hendlcy v. Chicago & N. IV. R. Co., supra, note 13; Webb v. Oregon-Wash. Rd.
& Nay'. Co., supra, note 6.
"Smith, Jeremiah, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 110:
... the alleged distinction does not solve the question of the existence of causal relation.
It is simply a restatement of the original problem in a different form of words."
